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Abstract
We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “ro-
bustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching
robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original match-
ing after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is
stable against robust deviations (for short, SaRD) up to depth k, if there is no robust
deviation up to depth k. As a smaller k imposes a stronger requirement for a matching
to be SaRD, we investigate the existence of a matching that is SaRD with a minimal
depth k. We constructively demonstrate that a SaRDmatching always exists for k = 3,
and establish sufficient conditions for k = 1 and 2.
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1 Introduction
The roommate problem is the one-sided one-to-one matching problem. On the one hand, it
is the simplest class of one-sided matching problems, and is a special case of both hedonic
coalition formation (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002) and network formation (Jackson,
2008). On the other hand, it is general enough to capture some difficulties associated with
one-sidedness: In particular, the roommate problem may not possess a stable matching
even though the marriage problem (i.e., the two-sided one-to-one matching problem) is
its subclass and always has a stable matching.1 For the non-existence of a stable outcome
is also an issue in the more-general one-sided problems, the roommate problem has been
long studied in game theory and other related fields.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a (class of) new solution concept(s) for
the roommate problem, which weakens stability and is applicable even when no stable
matching exists. In doing so, we first differentiate potential deviations from a matching
based on their “robustness.” We say that a subset D of agents forms a deviation from an
original matching μ if all agents in D can be strictly better off by rematching with each
other. Suppose that a deviation D from μ leads to a new matching ν. If ν is not stable,
which must be the case when no stable matching exists at all, the “original” deviation
to ν may be followed by a second deviation, the second by a third, and so on. Figure 1
illustrates a “tree” of such deviation chains: ν has three possible deviations that lead to
ν11, ν
2
1, and ν
3
1, these in turn have further deviations to ν
1
2, ν
2
2, . . . , ν
6
2, and so on. Taking the
possibility of subsequent deviations into account, we define the robustness of an original
deviation as follows: a deviation is robust up to depth k if none of the deviators gets worse
off than at the original matching after any sequence of κ ≤ k subsequent deviations. In
1Moreover, it is shown by simulations that the proportion of the problem instances (i.e., preference
profiles) with no stable matching increases steeply as the number of agents increases (Gusfield and Irving,
1989; Pittel and Irving, 1994).
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the case of Figure 1, for instance, the deviation from μ to ν is robust up to depth 2 if none
of the deviators gets worse off at any of the matchings v11, . . . , v
3
1 and ν
1
2, . . . , ν
6
2 than at
μ. It is robust up to depth 1 but not up to depth 2 if none in D gets worse off at any of
v11, . . . , v
3
1 but at least one does at some of ν
1
2, . . . , ν
6
2. When a deviation is robust up to
depth k, the deviators are guaranteed to be better off unless sufficiently many (i.e., more
than k) subsequent deviations follow.
A possible way to interpret our robustness concept is to suppose that agents have
max-min preferences and search for the worst-case consequence of their deviation within
those after k or less subsequent deviations. In such a scenario, potential deviators would
agree to form a deviation if (and only if) it is robust up depth k. With this interpretation
the depth k can be seen as the depth of reasoning, and the more sophisticated the agents
are the harder it is for them to agree on a possible deviation. Then one could argue that a
deviation would be likely to realize when it is robust up to a large depth k, as it would be
reachable even among extremely risk-averse and highly sophisticated agents.
For another interpretation that would be more broadly applicable, suppose next that
forming a deviation takes a certain period of time and hence, at most one deviation can
occur per period. With such a dynamic interpretation, the robustness of a deviation up
to depth k means that the gain from it is guaranteed to last for at least k periods of time,
no matter what happens in the future. To form a non-robust deviation, in contrast, the
deviators must accept the risk of potential losses within a shorter time window. It would
be then natural to argue that potential deviators would have less hesitation to realize a
deviation in the former case than the latter. For a matching to remain long, therefore, a
robust deviation up to k would be a more serious threat than non-robust deviations and
those robust up to smaller k’s.
Based on the idea that robust deviations make a matching lesser stable than the others,
we search for a matching that is free from the most serious deviations when anymatching
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is subject to some deviations (i.e., when no stable matching exists). More specifically, we
define a matching to be stable against robust deviations (henceforth, SaRD) up to depth k
when no deviation from it is robust up to depth k. By definition, if a matching is SaRD up
to depth k so is it up to any higher depth k′ > k. Our objective is thus to investigate the
existence of a matching that is SaRD up to as small depth k as possible.
To see how our concepts work in simple cases, suppose first that three agents a1, a2,
and a3 have a preference such that, respectively, a2 a1 a3, a3 a2 a1, and a1 a3 a2. If the
initial matching is such that every agent is single, none can get strictly worse off after any
sequence of voluntary deviations. That is, any deviation (e.g., the one by D = {a1, a2})
is robust up to any depth k and therefore, this initial matching is not SaRD up to any
depth k. Now suppose instead that a1 and a2 are matched while a3 is single at the initial
matching. Then, a deviation is possible only by D = {a2, a3}, and after that, there is a
unique subsequent deviation by D′ = {a1, a3}. Notice that a2 ∈ D becomes single after
D′ deviates and hence strictly worse off than at the initial matching. That is, the original
deviation by D is not robust up to depth 1 and the initial matching is SaRD up to depth 1.
Next suppose that there are five agents, from a1 to a5, and each ai has a preference
such that ai+1 ai ai−1 and all the other agents are unacceptable, where the subscripts are
in modulo 5. As in the previous paragraph, a matching is not SaRD up to any depth k
if it matches less than two pairs of agents. Suppose thus that a1 and a3 are matched to
a2 and a4, respectively, and a5 is single. Starting from this matching, the only possible
deviation is by D = {a4, a5}, and thereafter, the unique subsequent deviations are first
by D1 = {a2, a3} and then by D2 = {a1, a5}. Notice that a4 and a5 remain matched to
each other when D1 deviates, while a4 ∈ D becomes single after D2 follows. That is, the
original deviation by D is robust up to depth 1 but not up to depth 2; consequently, the
initial matching is SaRD up to depth 2 but not up to depth 1. Similarly, if there are seven
agents with a cyclic preference profile as above, a matching is SaRD up to depth 3 if it
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matches three pairs of “adjacent” agents (e.g., {a1, a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5, a6}), and nomatching
is SaRD up to depth 2.2 From these observations, one might expect that it becomes harder
to eliminate serious deviations (i.e., those robust up to larger k’s) when there is a longer
preference cycle.
In fact, our main result demonstrates that we can construct a matching that is SaRD
up to depth k = 3 for any roommate problem; i.e., with any number of agents and any
preference profile. To see the key idea underlying our construction, now suppose that
there are nine agents, from a1 to a9, and each ai’s preference is such that ai+1 ai ai−1
and all the others are unacceptable, where the subscripts are in modulo 9. If we match
four pairs of agents, say {a1, a2}, . . . , {a7, a8}, while leaving a9 as single, it is SaRD up
to depth 4 but not up to depth 3 or smaller, for similar reasonings as in the previous
paragraphs. However, if we insteadmatch only three pairs, {a1, a2}, {a4, a5}, and {a7, a8},
this matching is SaRD up to depth 2: For instance, if D = {a2, a3} deviates, a2 gets worse
off after two subsequent deviations, first by D1 = {a5, a6} and then by D2 = {a3, a4}. The
point here is that matching as many agents as possible may not be necessarily optimal to
eliminate robust deviations.3 Combining this idea with the general structure called party
permutation (Tan, 1991), we demonstrate that we can bound the depth of the most robust
deviations to k = 3 even for more complicated preferences.
Although no matching is SaRD up to depth k = 2 for some problems as we have men-
tioned above, our construction also establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a
SaRD matching up to depth k = 1 and 2. These conditions can be seen as an extension of
Tan’s (1991) condition for the existence of a stable matching, as all of them can be param-
eterized by a single common parameter. Unlike Tan’s, our conditions are not necessary,
but they are tight in a certain sense as we will argue in Section 6.1.
2See Example 1 in Section 6.1 for a formal proof.
3Note that in this example both of the above two matchings are Pareto optimal. We further discuss the
relation between our SaRD and Pareto efficiency in Section 6.2.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 briefly overviews the related
literature. Section 2 introduces our model and key definitions. Section 3 presents our al-
gorithm to construct SaRDmatchings and its key properties. Section 4 demonstrates some
implications of those properties, and then Section 5 provides the main results. Section 6
further discusses our concepts and results.
1.1 Related Literature
In the matching and related literatures, we are not the first to define a stability concept
based on chains of deviations and their final outcomes, and a number of related studies
take a similar approach. Among others, the most closely related is Barberà and Ger-
ber (2003). They study the hedonic coalition formation, which generalizes the roommate
problem, and propose a solution concept called durability. We share the spirit with them
in distinguishing what we call robust deviations, and actually, in the roommate problem
their durability coincides with our SaRD up to a sufficiently large depth k. However,
we further differentiate robust deviations across k’s and look for a SaRD matching up
to a minimal depth, whereas Barberà and Gerber (2003) treat all deviation chains of any
length as equally serious. The set of SaRD matchings up to depth 3 is generally smaller
than that of durable matchings and hence, our concept can be seen as a refinement of
durability. Relatedly, Troyan et al. (2018) propose in the school choice problem a solution
concept called essential stability, which also corresponds to our SaRD with a sufficiently
large k. It should be noted, however, that a stable matching always exists in the school
choice problem and their motivation differs from ours.
While we investigate a static model with dynamic arguments as a possible interpre-
tation and motivation, Kadam and Kotowski (2018) and Kotowski (2015) explicitly study
a dynamic marriage market, where agents have their preferences over the histories (i.e.,
sequences) of matched partners. They also define stability concepts for their dynamic
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setting, but it should be noted that their concepts reduce to the standard stability in the
static setting. Also in a dynamic marriage market, Kurino (2009) proposes credible stabil-
ity, which reduces in the static setting to a weaker version of our SaRD up to depth k = 1.
We formally define this weaker concept and establish its existence in Section 6.3.
Unsolvable roommate problems have been long studied in economics and other re-
lated fields, and several more solution concepts have been proposed. These include max-
imum stable matchings (Tan, 1990), almost stable matchings (Abraham et al., 2006), P-
stable matchings (Inarra et al., 2008), absorbing sets (Iñarra et al., 2013), and Q-stable
matchings (Biró et al., 2016). Each of those solutions focuses on a part of the proper-
ties that a stable matching satisfies, and extends it to unsolvable problems. In addition,
some studies apply other general concepts than stability to the roommate problem; e.g.,
stochastic stability (Klaus et al., 2010) and farsighted stable sets (Klaus et al., 2011). The
relation between our SaRD and other solution concepts will be discussed in more details
in Section 6.4.
2 Notation and Definitions
A roommate problem (N,) consists of a finite set N of agents and a profile  = (a)a∈N
of strict preference relations over N. Given agent a’s strict preference a, we write b a c
to denote [b a c or b = c]. We say that an agent a is acceptable to another agent b if
a b b. A matching is a bijection μ : N → N satisfying μ2(a) = a for all a ∈ N. In
the examples below, we also identify a matching with the partition it induces; e.g., when
we write μ = {{1, 2}, {3}}, it refers to the matching defined by μ(1) = 2, μ(2) = 1,
and μ(3) = 3. Given a subset D ⊆ N of agents and two matchings μ and ν, we write
ν D μ if ν(a) a μ(a) holds for all a ∈ D, and similarly, ν D μ if ν(a) a μ(a) holds
for all a ∈ D. A matching μ is called individually rational if μ N id, where id denotes
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the identity mapping over N. A matching μ is said to leave no mutually-acceptable pairs of
singles if
[a b b and b a a] =⇒ [μ(a) = a or μ(b) = b] ,
holds for all a, b ∈ N. Note that this can be seen as a mild efficiency property, as a
mutually-acceptable pair of singles implies Pareto inefficiency. Let us call a matching
regular if it is individually rational and leaves no mutually-acceptable pairs of singles.
A subset D of agents, associated with a matching ν, is said to form a deviation from μ
if (i) a ∈ D ⇒ ν(a) ∈ D, (ii) [b ∈ D and μ(b) ∈ D] ⇒ ν(b) = b, (iii) c, μ(c) ∈ D ⇒ ν(c) =
μ(c), and (iv) ν D μ. Notice that when μ is individually rational and |D| = 2, the identity
of D pins down the unique matching ν such that (D, ν) can be a deviation from μ. More
specifically, for (D, ν) to be a deviation from an individually rational μ with D = {a, b},
ν needs to be such that ν(a) = b, ν(b) = a, ν(c) = c for all c ∈ {μ(a), μ(b)} − {a, b},
and ν(d) = μ(d) for all d ∈ {a, b, μ(a), μ(b)}. Although in what follows we do not fully
specify the associated ν when |D| = 2, it should thus cause no confusion. When (D, ν) is
a deviation from μ, we write ν D μ. A matching μ is stable if there is no deviation (D, ν)
such that ν D μ.
Now we introduce our key concepts. A deviation (D, ν) from μ is called robust up to
depth k ∈ N, if νκ D μ holds for any sequence of deviations (D1, ν1), . . . , (Dκ, νκ) with
κ ≤ k such that
νκ Dκ νκ−1 Dκ−1 . . . D2 ν1 D1 ν. (∗)
When no deviation from it is robust up to depth k, a matching μ is said to be stable against
robust deviations (henceforce, SaRD) up to depth k.4 By definition, if a deviation is robust
4In what follows, we use the acronym “SaRD” both as an adjective (“S” for stable) and as a noun (“S”
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up to depth k, then so is it up to any k′ < k. Consequently, if a matching is SaRD up to
depth k, then it is also SaRD up to depth k′ for any k′ > k.
One might argue that our concept of SaRD is inconsistent in that we try to exclude
robust deviations while we allow non-robust subsequent deviations in defining robust
definitions per se. In response to such a concern, we make two remarks. First, requiring
consistency could lead to some conceptual subtlety, making it difficult for our solution
to be a matching-wise concept. A natural way to require consistency would be to call
a deviation “consistently robust” if the original deviators will be never worse-off after
any subsequent deviations as long as those subsequent deviations are also “consistently
robust.” However, such a recursive definition might have multiple fixed points, each
corresponding to a different set of all “consistently robust” deviations, and consequently, we
might be unable to determine pointewise if a matching is “consistently SaRD” or not.
Although we could jointly identify multiple sets of all “consistently SaRD” matchings, it
would require something outside our model, such as beliefs of the agents, to choose one.
Second but not less importantly, we do not claim that a SaRD matching is fully stable
in any sense or, in other words, that non-robust deviations would never realize. Instead
we would argue, as did in the introduction, that robust deviations are more likely to
realize than the others and hence, that SaRD matchings are less unstable than the others.
And this argument could still apply even if we define “consistently robust” deviations as
above: The benefit from such a deviation is guaranteed under the hypothesis that only
“consistently robust” deviations can follow. This hypothesis might be true if every agent
is sophisticated enough to tell a deviation is “consistently robust” or not based on a shared
criterion. However, even if an agent herself is sophisticated, she could be unsure if the
others are also sophisticated.5 Further, even if she believes the others to be sophisticated
for stability).
5This scenario parallels with the level-k theory, where each agent is assumed to believe the others are of
lower levels of strategic sophistication than herself.
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as well, she could be still unsure what criteria of “consistent robustness” they adopt, since
there could be multiple of them as argued above. For an agent facing such ambiguities,
a deviation would be less secure when it is “consistently robust” than when it is robust
in our sense. Our strategy in this study is to eliminate deviations that would be the most
secure and likely to realize.
2.1 Tan’s (1991) Concepts and Results
In this subsection, we introduce the concepts and results by Tan (1991), which we will
heavily rely on in our analysis. A permutation is a bijection from N to itself. A permutation
σ divides N into a finite number of cycles and hence, induces a partition P(σ) of N.6
Throughout the rest of the paper, given a permutation σ over N, let π denote its inverse
σ−1.
Definition 1. A permutation σ : N → N is called a semi-party permutation if for each
P ∈P(σ), one of the following holds:
• |P| = 1;
• |P| = 2 and σ(a) a a for each a ∈ P; or
• |P| ≥ 3 and σ(a) a π(a) a a for each a ∈ P. 
Given a semi-party permutation σ and hence its inverse π, an agent a ∈ N is said to
be superior for another agent b ∈ N when a b π(b). When a is not superior for b, a is
said to be inferior for b.7
Definition 2. A semi-party permutation σ is called a party permutation if the following
holds: for any a, b ∈ N, if a is superior for b, then b is inferior for a. 
6Namely, {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ N is a member of P(σ) if σm(a1) = am+1 for all m = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and
σn(a1) = a1.
7Here we slightly modify Tan’s (1991) original definition: when {a, b} ∈ P(σ), a and b are inferior
for each other according to our definition, whereas they are neither superior nor inferior for each other
according to Tan’s. As this does not alter the definition of party permutations at all, Tan’s (1991) results
continue to hold with our definition.
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When σ is a party permutation, P(σ) is called a stable partition, and each of its ele-
ments a party. Given a party permutation σ, for each a ∈ N, let P(a) denote the party
a belongs to; i.e., a ∈ P(a) ∈ P(σ). A party P in a stable partition P(σ) is called odd
(resp. even) if its cardinality is odd (resp. even). When it is a singleton, we call a party
solitary. Note that when {a} ∈P(σ) is a solitary party, b is acceptable to a if and only if b
is superior for a.
While the definition of a stable permutation might look complicated, Tan (1991) shows
that at least one exists for any problem, and that odd parties are uniquely identified across
all party permutations even when multiple exist:
Theorem (Tan, 1991). For any roommate problem (N,), at least one party permutation exists.
If σ and σ′ are both party permutations, then for any P ⊆ N with |P| being odd, P ∈P(σ) ⇐⇒
P ∈P(σ′).
For a problem (N,) with a party permutation σ, define #(N,) ∈ N by
#(N,) := max
[
{|P| : P ∈P(σ) and |P| is odd } ∪ {0}
]
.
That is, #(N,) denotes the maximal size of odd parties in (N,) if there exists any, and
is zero otherwise. Note that this definition is independent of the choice of σ thanks to the
above theorem. Tan (1991) characterizes the existence of a stable matching as follows:
Theorem (Tan, 1991). A stable matching exists in a roommate problem (N,) if and only if
#(N,) ≤ 1.8
8For a generalization to weak preferences, see also Chung (2000).
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3 The Algorithm
In this section, we introduce our algorithm that computes a matching μ, from an arbitrar-
ily given problem (N,) and an associated party permutation σ as its inputs.9 While the
procedure of the algorithmwe provide in Section 3.1 could appear complicated, its goal is
simple: it is designed to guarantee that its outcome μ always satisfies five key properties
as well as regularity.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we fix an arbitrary party permutation σ and take it
as given. Even though many of our concepts and symbols (such as superiority, π, P(a),
etc.) implicitly depend on the choice of σ, it should thus cause no confusion. Now, to
describe those properties, let us define
I◦μ := {a ∈ N : π(a) a μ(a)} ,
taking a matching μ as given. Notice that for a ∈ I◦μ, ν(a)  μ(a) implies ν(a) being
superior for a. Put differently, I◦μ is the set of agents who can potentially deviate with
inferior agents for them. The following are the five key properties we will need. We will
exploit the first four to warrant SaRD up to depth k = 3, and the last one to establish
sufficient conditions for k = 1 and 2.10
Property 1. For any a, b ∈ N, if a is superior for b and μ(b) = b, then μ(a) a b.
Property 2. For any a ∈ I◦μ, |P(a)| is odd and μ(π(a)) is inferior for π(a).
Property 3. For any a ∈ I◦μ, σ2(a) ∈ I◦μ.
Property 4. For any a ∈ I◦μ, μ(σ(a)) = σ2(a) and μ
(
σ3(a)
)
= σ4(a) imply [1] μ
(
σ5(a)
)
=
σ6(a) if |P(a)| = 7, and [2] σ5(a) ∈ I◦μ  σ6(a) if |P(a)| > 7.
9Although we take the party permutation σ as given, Tan and Hsueh (1995) provide an algorithm to
compute a party permutation in O(|N|2)-time.
10Indeed, the complexity of the algorithm is mostly due to Property 4. If we give it up, we can construct
a simpler algorithm, whose outcome satisfies the other Properties and is always SaRD up to depth k = 4.
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Property 5. For any a ∈ I◦μ,
[
|P(a)| = 3 or
{
|P(a)| = 5 and μ(σ(a)) = σ2(a)
}]
=⇒ μ(π(a)) = π2(a).
3.1 Description of the Algorithm
Taking a problem (N,) and a party permutation σ as given, construct a matching μ as
follows.11 To simplify the description, we write “define μ(a) := b,” when it should read
as “define μ(a) := b and μ(b) := a.” The whole procedure is divided into five phases.
3.1.1 Phase 1
Let E ⊆P(σ) be the family of even parties; i.e., E := {P ∈P(σ) : |P| is even}. For each
E ∈ E , arbitrarily take a ∈ E and define μ (σ2j(a)) = σ2j+1(a) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , |P|2
}
, as
illustrated in Figure 2 (a).
3.1.2 Phase 2
Let O3× ⊆P(σ)− E be the family of odd parties whose sizes are a multiple of three; i.e.,
O3× := {P ∈ P(σ)− E : |P| = 3n for some n ∈ N}. For each P ∈ O3×, arbitrarily take
a ∈ E and define μ (σ3j(a)) = σ3j+1(a) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , |P|3
}
, as illustrated in Figure 2
(b).
Remark 1. Phases 1 and 2 simply match “adjacent” pairs of agents (with respect to σ) within each
party, as illustrated in Figure 2. Note that every member of each P ∈ E is matched in Phase 1,
while there are |P|/3 unmatched agents in each P ∈ O3× in Phase 2. Note also that if P(a) ∈ O3×
11Note that the outcome of our algorithm below is not uniquely pinned down, as it can vary depending
on how to take a ∈ P in Phases 1, 2, and 4, and how to order the members of U0 and R0 in Phases 3 and
5. However, our main results apply to any of those possible outcomes. See also Section 6.1 for further
discussions.
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and a is not matched in this phase, then π(a) and σ(a) are matched, respectively, to π2(a) and
σ2(a). 
3.1.3 Phase 3
Let U0 ⊆ N be the set of agents who are not matched yet and U0 := P(σ)− (E ∪ O3×)
be the family of parties none from which is matched yet.12 Arbitrarily order the members
of U0 as x1, . . . , x|U0| and iterate the following step for t = 1, . . . , |U0|.
Remark 2. In what follows, Ut and Ut will be, respectively, the set of agents who are unmatched
by step t and the family of parties no agent from which is matched by step t. 
Step t = 1, . . . , |U0| of Phase 3:
If xt ∈ Ut−1, then, proceed to step t+ 1 withUt = Ut−1 andUt = Ut−1. Otherwise, define
Σt :=
{
y ∈ Ut−1 − {π(xt),π2(xt)} : xt is superior for y and y is acceptable for xt
}
.
If Σt is empty, then proceed to step t+ 1 with Ut = Ut−1 and Ut = Ut−1.13 Otherwise,
let yt ∈ Σt denote the best partner for xt among those in Σt; that is, y ∈ Σt ⇒ yt xt y.
Define μ(xt) = yt and Ut = Ut−1 − {P(xt), P(yt)}. If Ut = Ut−1, proceed to step t + 1
with Ut = Ut−1 − {xt, yt}. Otherwise, further divide the case as follows.
Case 1: P(xt) = P(yt) ∈ Ut−1.
In this case, there exist q, r ∈ {1, . . . , |P(xt)|} such that σq+1(yt) = xt and σr+1(xt) = yt.
Notice that one and only one of them is odd, for |P(xt)| = q + r + 2 must be odd by
12Remember that a ∈ U0 does not necessarily imply P(a) ∈ U0.
13Remember that when {xt} ∈ P(σ) is a solitary party, y is acceptable for xt if and only if y is superior
for xt, which can be the case only if xt is inferior for y. In such a case, thus, Σt must be empty.
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definition. It should be also noted that q ≥ 2 by the definition of Σt. Match the agents in
P(xt) = P(yt) as follows:
• Matching among σ(yt), . . . , σq(yt):
If q = 2m for some m ∈ N, then μ (σ2j−1(yt)) = σ2j(yt) for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. If
q = 2m+ 1 for somem ∈ N, then μ (σ2j−1(yt)) = σ2j(yt) for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1},
and μ(
(
σ2m(yt)
)
= σ2m+1(yt), leaving μ
(
σ2m−1(yt)
)
undefined. Figure 3 illustrates
the matching in these cases.
• Matching among σ(xt), . . . , σr(xt):
If r = 3n or 3n+ 1 for some n ∈ N ∪ {0}, then, let μ
(
σ3j
′−1(xt)
)
= σ3j
′
(xt) for each
j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Notice that μ (σ3n+1(xt)) is undefinedwhen r = 3n+ 1. If r = 3n+ 2
for some n ∈ N ∪ {0}, then, let μ
(
σ3j
′−2(xt)
)
= σ3j
′−1 for each j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
Figure 4 illustrates the matching in these cases.
Let Ut := Ut−1 − Mt, where Mt is the set of agents matched in this step, including xt and
yt, and proceed to step t+ 1.
Case 2: P(xt) = P(yt).
In this case, match the members of P(xt) and P(yt), respectively, if P(xt) ∈ Ut−1 and
P(yt) ∈ Ut−1 as follows:
• Matching among P(yt) ∈ Ut−1:
If P(yt) ∈ Ut−1, define μ
(
σ2j−1(yt)
)
:= σ2j(yt) for each j = 1, . . . ,
|P(yt)|−1
2 , as illus-
trated in Figure 5 (a).
• Matching among P(xt) ∈ Ut−1:14
If P(xt) ∈ Ut−1 and |P(xt)| = 3n + 1 for some n ∈ N, then, let μ
(
σ3j
′−1(xt)
)
=
σ3j
′
(xt) for each j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If P(xt) ∈ Ut−1 and |P(xt)| = 3n + 2 for some
n ∈ N, then let μ
(
σ3j
′−2(xt)
)
= σ3j
′−1(xt) for each j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} and μ
(
σ3n(xt)
)
=
14As Ut−1 ∩O3× = ∅ by definition, P(xt) ∈ Ut−1 implies that |P(xt)| is not a multiple of three.
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σ3n+1(xt). Figures 5 (b)–(c) illustrate the matching in these cases.
Let Ut := Ut−1 − Mt, where Mt is the set of agents matched in this step, including xt and
yt, and proceed to step t+ 1.
Remark 3. To see the point in this phase, suppose that xt′ is matched to yt′ in step t′ of this phase.
• If P(xt′) ∈ Ut′−1, then σ2(xt′) is matched to either σ(xt′) or σ3(xt′), and π(xt′) is always
matched to π2(xt′).
• If P(xt′) ∈ Ut′−1, then σ2(xt′) is again matched to either σ(xt′) or σ3(xt′), and we have
μ (π(xt′)) = π2(xt′) only if xt = π(xt′) is matched to some yt an earlier step t < t′ such
that P(xt) ∈ Ut−1.15 
Remark 4. For any xt, xt′ ∈ U|U0|, we have either (i) they are not mutually acceptable, (ii)
they are mutually inferior to each other, or (iii) P(xt) = P(xt′) ∈ U|U0|. To see this, suppose
that xt, xt′ ∈ U|U0| are mutually acceptable and that xt is superior for xt′ . For xt to be not
matched in step t of Phase 3, then, we should have Σt  xt′ . By the definition of Σt, it entails
xt′ ∈
{
π(xt),π2(xt′)
}
and thus P(xt) = P(xt′) ∈ U|U0|. 
3.1.4 Phase 4
Let V := U|U0|, i.e., the family of odd parties no member from which has been matched
yet. For each P ∈ V , fix an arbitrary member a ∈ P and match the members of P in the
following way, as illustrated in Figure 6:
• If |P| = 3n + 1 for some n ∈ N, then, define μ(a) := σ(a), μ (σ2(a)) := σ3(a),
μ
(
σ5(a)
)
:= σ6(a), and μ
(
σ3j−2(a)
)
:= σ3j−1(a) for each j ∈ {3, . . . , n}.16
• If |P| = 3n+ 2 for some n ∈ N, then define μ(a) := σ(a), μ (σ2(a)) := σ3(a), and
μ
(
σ3j−1(a)
)
:= σ3j(a) for each j ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
15For instance, take xt′ to be w1 in Figure 5 (b).
16As P is an odd party, |P| = 3n+ 1 for some n ∈ N implies |P| ≥ 7.
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Remark 5. As illustrated in Figure 6, if P(a) ∈ V but a is not matched in this phase, π(a) and
σ(a) are matched, respectively, to π2(a) and σ2(a). Combined with Remarks 1 and 3, if a ∈ I◦μ at
the final outcome,
• σ2(a) is matched to either σ(a) or σ3(a), and
• π(a) is matched to π2(a), unless π(a) = xt is matched to yt in step t such that P(a) ∈
Ut−1 during Phase 3. 
Remark 6. If a and b both remain unmatched by the end of this phase, they are either (i) not
mutually acceptable or (ii) mutually inferior to each other. At the end of Phase 3 they have a third
possibility, a ∈ {π(b),π2(b)} or b ∈ {π(a),π2(a)}, as argued in Remark 4, but not both of
such a and b can remain unmatched after Phase 4 matches the agents in P(a) = P(b) as specified
above. 
3.1.5 Phase 5
Let R0 be the set of those who still remain unmatched, and arbitrarily order its members
as r1, . . . , r|R0|. Iterate the following step for τ = 1, . . . , |R0|+ 1:
Step τ = 1, . . . , |R0| of Phase 5:
If rτ ∈ Rτ−1 and there exists some ri ∈ Rτ−1 who is mutually acceptable with rτ, then
define μ(rτ) := ri and proceed to step τ + 1 with Rτ := Rτ − {rτ, ri}.17 Otherwise,
proceed to step τ + 1 with Rτ := Rτ−1.
Step |R0|+ 1 of Phase 5:
For any r ∈ R|R0|, i.e., for any agent not matched yet, define μ(r) = r.
17In general multiple members of Rτ−1 may be mutually acceptable with rτ . Even if so, the choice of ri
can be arbitrary.
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3.2 Key Properties of the Algorithm
As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, the above algorithm is designed so that its
outcomes always satisfy Properties 1–5. Here we formally establish this fact.
Proposition 1. Let μ be an outcome of the algorithm of Section 3.1. Then, it is regular and satisfies
Properties 1–5 with respect to the party permutation σ fixed at the beginning of the algorithm.
Proof of regularity. It is immediate to check that μ is individually rational as we onlymatch
mutually-acceptable pairs during the algorithm, and it leaves no mutually-acceptable
pairs of singles because of Phase 5. 
Proof of Property 1. Suppose that a is superior for b and μ(b) = b, where μ is an outcome of
the algorithm. Also assume that b is acceptable for a, as otherwise μ(a) a b immediately
follows from individual rationality. Then, a should bematched to μ(a) by the end of Phase
4; otherwise, the assumptions are incompatible as argued in Remark 6. If μ(a) = π(a),
then μ(a) = π(a) a b immediately follows, since our assumptions of a being superior
for b and of μ(b) = b respectively imply that b is inferior for a and b = μ(a) = π(a).
If μ(a) = σ(a) = π(a), then we also obtain μ(a) a π(a) a b by the definition of a
(semi-)party permutation.
What remains to check is the case where a is matched to μ(a) ∈ {π(a), σ(a)} during
Phase 3. If a = yt is matched to xt in some step t during Phase 3, μ(a) = xt is superior for
a = yt and hence, μ(a) a b holds. If a = xt is matched to yt in some step t during Phase
3, our assumptions imply b ∈ Σt.18 Therefore, μ(a) a b holds by the definition of yt. 
Proof of Property 2. Suppose a ∈ I◦μ, where μ is an outcome of the algorithm. As this
implies μ(a) ∈ {π(a), σ(a)}, it is immediate to see that P(a) is odd; otherwise, a and
18In this case, b ∈ {π(a),π2(a)} holds for the following reason: As we assume μ(b) = b, it suffices to
confirm that neither π(a) nor π2(a) is single at μ, which is clearly true if μ(π(a)) = π2(a). Given a = xt is
matched to yt during Phase 3, μ(π(a)) = π2(a) fails only if π(a) = xt′ is matched to yt′ in an earlier step
t′ < t, as argued in Remark 3. Moreover, for both a and π(a) to remain unmatched until step t′, we must
have P(a) ∈ Ut′−1 and hence, π2(a) should be also matched (to π3(a)) in step t′.
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μ(a) ∈ {π(a), σ(a)} should be matched during Phase 1. Moreover, by the arguments in
Remark 5, either μ(π(a)) = π2(a) or π(a) = xt is matched to yt in some step t during
Phase 3. In either case, μ(π(a)) is inferior for π(a). 
Proof of Property 3. Suppose a ∈ I◦μ, where μ is an outcome of the algorithm. As argued in
Remark 5, then, σ2(a) should be matched to σ(a) or σ3(a) and in either case, σ2(a) ∈ I◦μ
holds. 
Proof of Property 4. Suppose a ∈ I◦μ, μ(σ(a)) = σ2(a) and μ
(
σ3(a)
)
= σ4(a), where μ is an
outcome of the algorithm, and also |P(a)| ≥ 7 since the claim vacuously holds otherwise.
Note that P(a) ∈ U0, because P(a) ∈ O3× is incompatible with the assumptions. There-
fore, if P(a) ∈ V , there exists some t such that P(a) ∈ Ut−1 −Ut. For the assumptions
of a ∈ I◦μ, μ(σ(a)) = σ2(a) and μ
(
σ3(a)
)
= σ4(a) to simultaneously hold, then, the only
possibility is that |P(a)| = 3n+ 2 and xt = σ5(a), as seen in Figure 5 (c). In such a case,
μ
(
σ5(a)
)
= yt is inferior for σ5(a) = xt by definition, and σ6(a) = σ(xt) is matched to
σ7(a) = σ2(xt). That is, we have both σ5(a) ∈ I◦μ and σ6(a) ∈ I◦μ.
Next, consider the case of P(a) ∈ V , i.e., the case where none from P(a) is matched by
the end of Phase 3. If P(a) ∈ V and |P(a)| = 7, then μ (σ5(a)) = σ6(a) as shown in Figure
6 (a). If P(a) ∈ V and |P(a)| > 7, then, σ5(a) is not matched during Phase 4 and σ6(a) is
matched to σ7(a), as illustrated in Figure 6 (b)–(d). Since σ5(a) cannot match to a superior
parter during Phase 5 as argued in Remark 6, these imply σ5(a) ∈ I◦μ and σ6(a) ∈ I◦μ as
required. 
Proof of Property 5. Suppose a ∈ I◦μ, where μ is an outcome of the algorithm. First, if
|P(a)| = 3, Phase 2 should match π(a) and π2(a). Second, suppose that |P(a)| = 5 and
μ(π(a)) = π2(a). As argued in Remark 5, then, π(a) = xt is matched to yt in some step
t of Phase 3 with P(a) ∈ Ut. More specifically, yt = σ(a) is the only possibility under the
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assumption of |P(a)| = 5.19 It then follows that μ(σ(a)) = π(a) = σ2(a) as required. 
3.3 Performance of the Algorithm when a Stable Matching Exists
Although our goal is to establish a global property that is applicable even when no stable
matching exists, it should be noted that the outcomes of our algorithm are stable when-
ever a stable matching exists.
Proposition 2. For any roommate problem (N,) with a stable matching, any outcome μ of the
above algorithm is stable.
Proof. Suppose that a stable matching exists in (N,) and σ is a party permutation. By
Tan’s (1991) Theorems we stated in Section 2.1, thus, each party P ∈ P(σ) is either even
or solitary. In such a case, only Phase 1 matches agents throughout the entire algorithm.
Specifically, any outcome of our algorithm is such that (i) if a is in an even party, μ(a) ∈
{π(a), σ(a)}, and (ii) if a is in a solitary party, μ(a) = a = π(a).20 By the definition of a
party permutation, such a matching is stable. 
4 Implications of Properties 1–2
In this section, we provide a number of preliminary lemmas that follow from Properties
1–2. They impose restrictions on possible deviations from a matching satisfying those
properties, and as such, will be useful when we establish our main results in the next sec-
tion. To concisely state those restrictions, here we introduce some more notation. Taking
19To see this, note first that if P(xt) = 3n+ 2 and yt ∈ P(xt), as illustrated in Figure 5 (c), σ(xt) ≡ a should
be matched to σ2(xt) ≡ σ(a). In the case of P(a) = 5, thus, yt ∈ P(a) is necessary for a ∈ I◦μ . Moreover,
since neither π(xt) ≡ π2(a) nor π2(xt) ≡ π3(a) can be a member of Σt by definition, π3(xt) ≡ σ(a) is the
only candidate for yt ∈ P(a).
20Remember that when a is a solitary party member (i.e., when a = π(a)), b is acceptable for a if and only
if b is superior for a. By the definition of a party permutation, therefore, no pair of solitary party members
is mutually acceptable.
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a deviation (D, ν) from μ as given, let Sν := {a ∈ N : ν(a) a π(a)} be the set of agents
who are matched to their superior agents at ν. Further, divide D ∩ Sν into two as follows:
Cy := {a ∈ D ∩ Sν : (π ◦ ν)t(a) ∈ Sν for all t ∈ N}, and (1)
Ch := (D ∩ Sν)− Cy. (2)
Note that by the finiteness of N,
[a ∈ Cy] =⇒ [there exists t∗ ∈ N such that (π ◦ ν)t∗(a) = a], (3)
where t∗ becomes 1 when ν(a) = σ(a). That is, a ∈ Cy means that π ◦ ν forms a cycle
within Sν that involves a, as illustrated in Figure 7. In contrast, a ∈ Ch implies (π ◦
ν)t
′
(a) ∈ Sν for some t′; i.e., the chain induced by π ◦ ν gets outside of Sν before it forms
a cycle.
4.1 Implications of Property 1
The first Lemma is a key implication of Property 1. It guarantees that for any deviation
(D, ν), there exists some agent a ∈ D ∩ I◦μ. Consequently, the other properties on μ re-
garding I◦μ become relevant.
Lemma 1. Let μ be a regular matching satisfying Property 1, and suppose that ν E μ where
E = {a, b} and ν(a) = b. Then, at least one of the following holds: (i) a ∈ I◦μ, b is an inferior
agent for a, and μ(b) = b; and (ii) b ∈ I◦μ, a is an inferior agent for b, and μ(a) = a.
Proof. First, by the definition of a party permutation, either a is inferior for b or b is inferior
for a (or both). Second, μ’s regularity implies that at least one of μ(a) = a and μ(b) = b
must hold.21 Third, ν E μ and Property 1 imply both [1] either a is inferior for b or
21Note that μ’s individually rationality and ν E μ imply that a and b are mutually acceptable.
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μ(b) = b, and [2] either b is inferior for a or μ(a) = a. Combining those claims altogether,
we can conclude that at least one of the following holds: [i] a is inferior for b and μ(a) = a,
and [ii] b is inferior for a and μ(b) = b.
If a ∈ I◦μ and b is inferior for a, it follows that μ(a) a π(a) a b = ν(a), but this is
a contradiction to the assumption of ν E μ. Therefore, a ∈ I◦μ if b is inferior for a, and
symmetrically, b ∈ I◦μ if a inferior for b. Combined with the conclusion of the previous
paragraph, these complete the proof. 
Next is a useful, albeit immediate, consequence of the previous Lemma. It substan-
tially simplifies our proof to bound the robustness of a deviation ν from μ. Specifically,
suppose that a ∈ D ∩ Sν and νκ Dκ · · · ν1 D1 ν, where ν(a) ∈ Dκ and νκ(a) = a. Then,
the following Lemma guarantees that a prefers μ(a) = a to νκ(a) = a, and thereby that ν
is not robust up to depth κ.
Lemma 2. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 1. If a ∈ Sν, then
μ(a) = a.
Proof. If a ∈ D, the assumption of a ∈ Sν means μ(a) = ν(a) a π(a) a a, which implies
μ(a) = a. If a ∈ D and hence ν {a,ν(a)} μ, μ(a) = a follows from a ∈ Sν and Lemma
1. 
4.2 Implications of Property 2
Next we turn to the implications of Property 2 on the structure of Cy and Ch.
Lemma 3. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 2. If a ∈ D ∩ Sν
and (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν, then, (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ D.
Proof. Notice that a ∈ D ∩ Sν implies ν(a) ∈ D− Sν and hence ν(a) ∈ I◦μ. By Property 2,
(π ◦ ν)(a) should be matched to an inferior agent at μ. Thus, (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ D is necessary
for (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν to hold. 
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Lemma 4. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 2. If a ∈ Cy, then
(π ◦ ν)t(a) ∈ Cy for all t ∈ N.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 3. 
Lemma 5. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 2. If Ch is
nonempty, then there exists a ∈ Ch such that (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 3. 
Lemma 6. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 2. If a ∈ Sν −D,
ν(a) = σ(a), and (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν, then (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Ch.
Proof. Note that ν(a) = μ(a) ∈ I◦μ follows from a ∈ Sν − D and ν(a) = σ(a). By Prop-
erty 2, π(ν(a)) is matched to an inferior agent at μ. For (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν to hold, hence,
(π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ D is necessary. Further, (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Cy must follow, because otherwise
Lemma 4 entails a ∈ Cy ⊆ D, which contradicts the assumption of a ∈ D. 
Lemma 7. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Property 2. For any
a ∈ Cy, then, P(a) is an odd party.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary member a of Cy. By definition, (π ◦ ν)t(a) = a for some t ∈ N.
Let b := (π ◦ ν)t−1(a), or equivalently b := ν(σ(a)), so that b is another member of Cy
by Lemma 4. As b ∈ D ∩ Sν implies ν(b) ∈ D − Sν, we should have ν(b) ∈ I◦μ and
hence, P(ν(b)) is odd. Recalling that ν(b) ≡ σ(a) and hence P(a) = P(ν(b)), the proof is
complete. 
5 Main Results
In this section, we establish a bound for the robustness of a deviation ν from μ in each
of three mutually-exclusive subcases depending on the composition of D ∩ Sν ≡ Ch ∪ Cy
(Claim 1–3). Combining those Claims altogether, we obtain our main results.
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Claim 1. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regularmatching satisfying Property 2. IfD∩Sν =
∅, then ν is not robust up to depth 1.
Proof. By the regularity of μ, for any a, ν(a) ∈ D, either μ(a) = a or μ(ν(a)) = ν(a).
Without any loss, suppose μ(ν(a)) = ν(a). On the one hand, a prefers π(a) to ν(a) as
a ∈ Sν by the assumption of D ∩ Sν = ∅. On the other hand, π(a) also prefers a to
ν(π(a)), as
• if π(a) ∈ D, π(a) ∈ Sν by the assumption of D ∩ Sν = ∅, and
• otherwise, ν(π(a)) ∈ {π(a), μ(π(a))} and μ(π(a)) is inferior by Property 2.
Therefore, we can construct a further deviation ν′ by matching a and π(a), so that ν(a) ∈
D prefers μ(ν(a)) = ν(a) to ν′(ν(a)) = ν(a). That is, the original deviation ν is not robust
up to depth 1. 
Claim 2. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Properties 1 and 2. If
Ch = ∅, then ν is not robust up to depth 1.
Proof. By Lemma 5, there exists a ∈ Ch such that (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν. Lemma 2 then implies
μ(a) = a and thus, it suffices to establish a further deviation involving ν(a). As a ∈ Sν
and (π ◦ ν)(a) ∈ Sν, ν(a) and π(ν(a)) prefer each other to their partners at ν. We can
thus construct a further deviation ν′ from ν by matching ν(a) and π(ν(a)) so that a ∈ D
prefers μ(a) = a to ν′(a) = a. That is, the original deviation ν is not robust up to depth
1. 
Claim 3. Suppose ν D μ, where μ is a regular matching satisfying Properties 1–4. If
Ch = ∅ = Cy, then ν is not robust up to depth (at most) 3.
Proof. To begin, fix an agent b ∈ ν(Cy) := {x ∈ N|x = ν(y) for some y ∈ Cy} such that
σ3(b) ∈ Cy. This is without loss of generality for the following reason: Such b would not
exist only if for each b ∈ ν(Cy), there exists some tb ∈ N such that σ4tb(b) = b.22 This
22Notice that σ3(b) ∈ Cy is equivalent to σ4(b) ∈ ν(Cy), for ν(Cy) = σ(Cy) by Lemma 4.
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cannot be the case, however, since b ∈ ν(Cy) implies π(b) ∈ Cy by Lemma 4, and hence,
P(b) must be an odd party by Lemma 7. Let m ∈ N be such that |P(b)| = 2m+ 1, and
define cj := σj(b) for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}. Remember that μ(a) = a by Lemma 2, where a :=
ν(b). Therefore, to establish the non-robustness of the original deviation ν up depth κ, it
suffices to construct a sequence of κ further deviations such that [1] νκ Dκ · · · ν1 D1 ν,
[2] a ∈ D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dκ, and [3] b ∈ Dκ.
If c1 ∈ Sν, ν is not robust up to depth 1 since we can immediately construct ν1 by
matching b and c1 so that ν1 {b,c1} ν. For the rest of the proof, thus, we investigate two
subcases of c1 ∈ Sν.
Case 1: c1 ∈ Sν and ν(c1) = c2. In this case, we can show c1 ∈ D as follows.23 Suppose
towards a contradiction that c1 ∈ D ∩ Sν. Since Ch = ∅ is assumed, c1 must be another
member of Cy. As N is finite, c1 ∈ Cy is possible only if (π ◦ ν)t(c1) = c1 for some t ∈ N.
By Lemma 4, thus, (π ◦ ν)t−1(c1) ≡ (π ◦ ν)−1(c1) is also in Cy ⊆ (D ∩ Sν). It then follows
that c2 ∈ D− Sν because by definition, (π ◦ ν)−1(c1) ≡ ν(σ(c1)) ≡ ν(c2). However, this
contradicts Property 3 as we have both b ∈ D − Sν and σ2(b) ≡ c2 ∈ D − Sν, which
respectively imply b ∈ I◦μ and σ2(b) ∈ I◦μ.
As we now have c1 ∈ Sν −D in addition to the assumptions of Ch = ∅ and of ν(c1) =
c2 ≡ σ(c1), Lemma 6 implies (π ◦ ν)(c1) ∈ Sν. We can construct ν1 and ν2, respectively by
matching {π(ν(c1)), ν(c1)} and {c1, b}, so that ν2 {c1,b} ν1 {π(ν(c1)),ν(c1)} ν. That is, the
original deviation ν is not robust up to depth 2.
Case 2: c1 ∈ Sν and ν(c1) = c2. This case arises only when μ(c1) = c2, as Property 3
entails c2 ∈ I◦μ. Note further that |P(b)| ≥ 5 is also necessary; if |P(b)| = 3, c2 = π(b) =
(π ◦ ν)(a) should be a member of Cy ⊆ Sν, which contradicts ν(c2) = c1 being inferior for
23Notice that if μ satisfies Property 5, c1 ∈ D and ν(c1) = c2 together imply |P(b)| ≥ 5. This is because if
|P(b)| = 3, Property 5 implies μ(c1) = c2, which contradicts c1 ∈ D and ν(c1) = c2.
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c2. That is, c3 ≡ σ3(b) = b should exist in this case. If c3 ∈ Sν, then ν is not robust up to
depth 2, because we can construct ν1 and ν2 by respectively matching {c2, c3} and {b, c1},
so that ν2 {b,c1} ν1 {c2,c3} ν.
For the rest of the proof, we consider the case of c3 ∈ Sν. We then should have c3 ∈ D,
because the assumptions of c3 ≡ σ3(b) ∈ Cy and Ch = ∅ entail c3 ∈ D ∩ Sν ≡ Cy ∪ Ch.24
First, suppose ν(c3) = μ(c3) = c4. Then, as in the last part of Case 1, Lemma 6 implies
(π ◦ ν)(c3) ∈ Sν. Therefore, we can construct ν1, ν2, and ν3, by respectively matching
{π(ν(c3)), ν(c3)}, {c2, c3}, and {b, c1}, so that
ν3 {b,c1} ν2 {c2,c3} ν1 {π(ν(c3)),ν(c3)} ν. (4)
That is, the original deviation ν is not robust up to depth 3.
Second, suppose ν(c3) = μ(c3) = c4. This requires |P(b)| ≥ 7, since if |P(b)| = 5, the
original assumption of b ∈ ν(Cy) implies c4 = π(b) ∈ Cy, which is incompatible with
ν(c3) = c4. Then, c5 ∈ Sν cannot hold for the following reason:
• If |P(b)| = 7, the original assumption of b ∈ ν(Cy) implies c6 = π(b) ∈ Cy ⊆ D.
Then c5 ∈ Sν would require c5 ∈ D and hence c5 ∈ Cy, as μ(c5) = c6 by Property
4 and Ch = ∅ by assumption. By the definition of Cy, however, c5 ∈ Cy implies
c6 ≡ σ(c5) ∈ Sν, which is incompatible with c6 ∈ Cy.
• If P(b) > 7, since c5 ∈ I◦μ by Property 4, c5 ∈ Sν would again require c5 ∈ D, which
is followed by c5 ∈ Cy and c6 ∈ ν(Cy). This is a contradiction, because Property 4
implies c6 ∈ I◦μ while ν(Cy) ⊆ D− Sν by definition.
Given c5 ∈ Sν, we can construct ν1, ν2, and ν3, by respectively matching {c4, c5}, {c2, c3},
24Note that if μ satisfies Property 5, c3 ∈ Sν −D implies |P(b)| > 5 for the following reason: If |P(b)| = 5,
Property 5 implies that c3 = π2(b) and c4 = π(b) are matched with each other at μ. However, this is a
contradiction because c4 = π(b) is a member of Cy ⊆ D by definition.
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and {b, c1}, so that
ν3 {b,c1} ν2 {c2,c3} ν1 {c4,c5} ν. (5)
That is, the original deviation ν is not robust up to depth 3. 
Combining the three Claims above, we obtain our main theorem:
Theorem 1. A regular matching satisfying Properties 1–4 is SaRD up to depth (at most) 3. For
any problem (N,), thus, there exists a matching that is SaRD up to depth (at most) 3.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Claims 1–3 and Proposition 1. 
Further, the proof of Claim 3 also establishes sufficient conditions for the outcomes of
our algorithm to be SaRD up to depth 1 and 2:
Theorem 2. If #(N,) ≤ 3, a regular matching satisfying Properties 1–3 and 5 is SaRD up to
depth (at most) 1. Thus there exists a matching that is SaRD up to depth 1 for any problem such
that #(N,) = 3.
Proof. In the proof of Claim 3, we establish without employing Property 4 that ν is not
robust up to depth 1 in the case of c1 ∈ Sν. With Property 5, c1 ∈ Sν arises only if
#(N,) > 3: For the case of ν(c1) = c2, see footnote 23; for the case of ν(c1) = c2, we
established P(b) > 3 in the main body of the proof. 
Theorem 3. If #(N,) ≤ 5, a regular matching satisfying Properties 1–3 and 5 is SaRD up to
depth (at most) 2. Thus there exists a matching that is SaRD up to depth 2 for any problem such
that #(N,) = 5.
Proof. In the proof of Claim 3, we establish without employing Property 4 that ν is not
robust up to depth 2, except for the case where c1 ∈ Sν, ν(c1) = c2, and c3 ∈ Sν −D. With
Property 5, such a case arises only if #(N,) > 5; see footnote 24. 
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6 Discussions
6.1 Tightness of the Results
In this section we discuss the tightness of our main results. It should be first noted that
the bound of k = 3 we establish for general existence in Theorem 1 is tight in the sense
that no matching is SaRD up to depth 2 for some problems. The next example, which we
have informally discussed in the introduction, illustrates this point.
Example 1. Suppose that N = {a1, a2, . . . , a7} and that for each i = 1, . . . , 7, only ai+1
and ai−1 are acceptable ai and ai+1 ai ai−1, where all subscripts are in modulo 7. The
unique party permutation is given by σ(ai) = ai+1 for each i so thatP(σ) = {N}. In this
problem, no matching is SaRD up to depth 2. To see this, first notice that for a matching
to be SaRD up to any depth, it should match three pairs of adjacent agents; if fewer,
such a matching is not regular because there must exist a pair of adjacent (i.e., mutually
acceptable) singles. It thus suffices to confirm that μ = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5, a6}, {a7}}
is not SaRD up to depth 2, as all the other candidates are symmetric. Starting from μ, a
deviation chain ν2 D2 ν1 D1 ν D μ is possible only with D = {a6, a7}, D1 = {a4, a5},
and D2 = {a2, a3}. As D = {a6, a7} prefer ν2 = {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}} to μ, the
deviation ν from μ is robust up to depth 2 and hence μ is not SaRD up to depth 2. 
In contrast, our sufficient conditions in Theorems 2–3 are not tight in two different
ways: Note that Theorems 2–3 establish the conditions for any outcome of our algorithm
to be SaRD up to depth k = 1 and 2, while our algorithm generally has multiple possible
outcomes as mentioned in footnote 11. First, therefore, some outcomes may be SaRD up to
a smaller k than those guaranteed by Theorems 2–3, even when not all possible outcomes
are. Second, there may be a matching that is SaRD up to a smaller k than any outcome of
our algorithm is. The following examples demonstrate that such possibilities do indeed
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exist.
Example 2. Suppose that N = {a1, . . . , a7, b1, . . . , b3, c1, . . . , c3}, and let
σ =
⎛
⎜⎝ a1 a2 · · · a6 a7 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3
a2 a3 · · · a7 a1 b2 b3 b1 c2 c3 c1
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
where the right-hand side denotes σ(a1) = a2, σ(a2) = a3, and so on. Note thatP(σ) ={
{a1, . . . , a7}, {b1, . . . , b3}, {c1, . . . , c3}
}
. Let  be a preference profile such that
• a1 is such that a2 a1 a7 a1 b1 a1 a1,
• a5 is such that c1 a5 a6 a5 a4 a5 a5,
• b1 is such that a1 b1 b2 b1 b3 b1 b1,
• c1 is such that c2 c1 c3 c1 a5 c1 c1, and
• for any d ∈ {a1, a5, b1, c1}, d is such that σ(d) d π(d) d d.
Further, for any α, β ∈ N, assume that α is unacceptable for β unless otherwise specified
above. In this problem (N,), where σ is the unique party permutation, we compare two
outcomes of our algorithm.
To begin, suppose that b2 and c2 are taken as a ∈ P during Phase 2, so that they are
matched to b3 and c3. At the beginning of Phase 3, then, U0 = {a1, . . . , a7, b1, c1}. First,
suppose further that a1 is taken as x1. Then, x1 = a1 is matched to y1 = b1 at step 1 of
Phase 3 and the final outcome of the algorithm will be
μ =
{
{a1, b1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5, c1}{a6, a7}, {b2, b3}, {c2, c3}
}
,
as illustrated in Figure 8 (a). Second, suppose instead that c1 is taken as x1. Then, x1 = c1
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is matched to y1 = a5 at step 1 of Phase 3 and the final outcome of the algorithm will be
μ′ =
{
{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5, c1}{a6, a7}, {b1}, {b2, b3}, {c2, c3}
}
,
as illustrated in Figure 8 (b).
Comparing these two matchings, we can observe that not all outcomes of our algo-
rithm are SaRD up to the same depth. On the one hand, μ is not SaRD up to 2, because
the deviation by D = {a1, a2} is robust up to depth 2. On the other hand, μ′ is SaRD up
to depth 1: There are only two deviations from μ′, one by D = {b1, b3} and the other by
D = {c1, c3}, and it is immediate to confirm that neither is robust up to depth 1. 
Example 3. Suppose that N = {a1, . . . , a5, b1, . . . , b5} and that for each i = 1, . . . , 5,
• only ai+1, ai−1, bi are acceptable for ai and ai+1 ai ai−1 ai bi, and
• only bi+1, bi−1, ai are acceptable for bi and bi+1 bi bi−1 bi ai,
where all the subscripts are in modulo 5. The unique party permutation is then given by
σ(ai) = ai+1 and σ(bi) = bi+1 so that P(σ) = {{a1, . . . , a5}, {b1, . . . , b5}}. Note that in
this problem, any outcome of our algorithm is symmetric to
μ :=
{
{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}, {b1, b2}, {b3, b4}, {a5, b5}
}
,
which is graphically illustrated in Figure 9 (a).25 It is then easy to check that the deviation
from μ by D = {a4, a5} is robust up to depth 1. That is, any outcomes, including μ, of
the algorithm are not SaRD up depth k = 1, although they are so up to depth k = 2 by
Theorem 3.
However, the following matching μ′, which is illustrated in Figure 9 (b), is SaRD up to
25To see this, notice that Phase 3 does not match any agents in this problems, as Σt is always empty.
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depth 1:
μ′ :=
{
{a1, b1}, {a2, b2}, {a3, b3}, {a4, b4}, {a5, b5}
}
.
Note that for any deviation (D′, ν′) from μ′, there exists either [i] ai ∈ D′ such that
ν′(ai−1) = ai−2 or [ii] bi ∈ D′ such that ν′(bi−1) = bi−2. In the first case, a further de-
viation ν′1 by {ai, ai−1} makes ai−2 ∈ D′ worse off than at the original μ. Therefore, the
deviation (D′, ν′) is not robust up to depth 1. As the second case is symmetric, we can
conclude that μ′ is SaRD up to depth 1. 
However, it should be also noted that Theorems 2–3 provide sufficient conditions that
depend only on σ, whereas more detailed information of  would be necessary to pin
down matchings that are SaRD up to the smallest k.26 Indeed, the next proposition sug-
gests that the sufficient conditions derived from our algorithm are tight among those
depend only on σ.
Proposition 3. Let σ be a permutation over N such that |P| = 2m+ 1 for some P ∈P(σ) and
m ∈ N. Then, there exist  = (i)i∈N and k ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that
• σ is a party permutation for (N,),
• any outcome of the algorithm in Section 3 for (N,) is SaRD up to depth k, and
• no matching is SaRD up to depth k− 1 in (N,),
where “SaRD up to depth 0” should be read as the standard stability.
Proof. Given N and σ, let  be such that for all a, b ∈ N, b a a ⇒ b ∈ {π(a), σ(a)} and
σ(a) a π(a). It is then immediate to check that σ is a party permutation for (N,). Note
also that with such (N,), our algorithm matches no pair of agents during Phases 3 and
5. We consider four possible cases separately.
26Notice that a same σ can be a party permutation for various distinct preference profiles.
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First, if #(N,) = 3, any outcome of the algorithm is SaRD up to depth 1 by Theorem
2, and no matching is stable by Tan’s (1991) Theorem. Thus, the claim holds in this case.
Second, suppose #(N,) = 5 and let P ∈ P(σ) be a party such that |P| = 5. At
any regular matching μ, then, the members of P should be matched so that μ(a) = σ(a),
μ
(
σ2(a)
)
= σ3(a), and μ
(
σ4(a)
)
= σ4(a) for some a ∈ P, as illustrated in Figure 6 (c).
It is easy to see that the deviation from μ by D = {σ3(a), σ4(a)} is robust up to depth 1.
Consequently, no matching is SaRD up to depth 1 while the outcomes of our algorithm
are SaRD up to depth 2 by Theorem 3.
Third, suppose #(N,) > 5 and that for any P ∈ P(σ), |P| is either one, even, or a
multiple of three. Fix an arbitrary odd party P with |P| = 3n for some n > 1. At any
regular matching μ, then, there should exist α ∈ P (as b2 in Figure 2 (b) for instance) such
that μ(α) = α, μ(π(α)) = π2(α), and μ (σ(α)) = σ2(α).27 As the deviation from μ by
D = {π(α), α} is robust up to depth 1, no matching can be SaRD up to depth 1. Now,
let μ be an outcome of our algorithm and (ν,D) be an arbitrary deviation from μ such
that D ∩ P = ∅. Note that for any α ∈ D ∩ P, μ(α) = α and ν(α) = π(α). Moreover,
since our algorithm matches the members of P in the way as of Figure 2 (b), either [i]
ν (σ(α)) = σ(α) or [ii] ν (σ(α)) = μ (σ(α)) = σ2(α) and ν
(
σ3(α)
)
= μ
(
σ3(α)
)
= σ3(α).
In either case, ν is not robust up to depth 2 and thus, the outcome μ of our algorithm is
SaRD up to depth 2.
Lastly, suppose #(N,) > 5 and that |P| is odd but not a multiple of three for some
P ∈ P(σ). Then, at any regular matching μ, there should exist α ∈ P (as b4 in Figure 6
(a)–(b) and b10 in Figure 6 (d)) such that μ(α) = α, μ(π(α)) = π2(α), μ (σ(α)) = σ2(α),
and μ
(
σ3(α)
)
= σ4(α). Given this observation, it is easy to check that the deviation ν
from μ by D = {α,π(α)} is robust up to depth 2. That is, no matching is SaRD up to
27To see this, remember that for each a, only π(a) and σ(a) are acceptable. As |P| is odd, there needs to
exist some α with μ(α) = α. By regularity, both π(α) and σ(α) need to be matched, and π2(α) and σ2(α),
respectively, are their only possible partners.
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depth 2 in this case, whereas the outcomes of our algorithm are always SaRD up to depth
3 by Theorem 1. 
6.2 SaRD and Efficiency
In this section we briefly discuss the efficiency properties of SaRD matchings. To begin,
remember that the outcome of our algorithm is regular (Proposition 1). Indeed, as we
formally state below, regularity is a property of a SaRD matching in general, not only of
the outcomes of our algorithm. We could thus argue that a SaRD matching always meets
a minimal efficiency criterion, in the sense that it leaves no mutually-acceptable pair of
singles.
Fact 1. For any k ≥ 1, if a matching μ is SaRD up to depth k, then it is regular.
Proof. If μ is not individually rational, i.e., if a a μ(a) for some a, then the deviation
({a}, ν) is robust up to any depth k ≥ 1, where ν(b) = b if b ∈ {a, μ(a)} and ν(b) = μ(b)
otherwise. If μ leaves a mutually-acceptable pair of singles, i.e., if a b b, b a a, μ(a) = a
and μ(b) = b for some a and b, then, the deviation ({a, b}, ν′) is robust up to any depth
k ≥ 1, where ν′(a) = b, ν′(b) = a, and ν(c) = μ(c) for all c ∈ N − {a, b}. 
However, no mutually-acceptable pair of singles is obviously weaker than Pareto effi-
ciency. Then it would be natural to ask if the SaRD property implies full Pareto efficiency,
or if the outcomes of the algorithm in Section 3 are Pareto efficient. The answers to these
questions are negative: The next example demonstrates that the outcomes of our algo-
rithm are not always Pareto efficient. This is essentially because Pareto improvements do
not necessarily preserve the SaRD property (with a same depth k).
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Example 4. Let N = {a1, a2, . . . , a7, b1, . . . , b3, c1, . . . , c3, d1, . . . , d3, e1, . . . , e3}, and let
σ =
⎛
⎜⎝ a1 a2 · · · a6 a7 b1 b2 b3 · · · e1 e2 e3
a2 a3 · · · a7 a1 b2 b3 b1 · · · e2 e3 e1
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
where the right-hand side denotes σ(a1) = a2, σ(a2) = a3, and so on. It is easy to check
such σ inducesP(σ) = {{a1, . . . , a7}, {b1, b2, b3}, . . . , {e1, e2, e3}}. Let  be a preference
profile such that
• a1 is such that a2 a1 a7 a1 b1 a1 a1,
• a5 is such that c1 a5 a6 a5 a4 a5 a5,
• b1 is such that a1 b1 b2 b1 b3 b1 b1,
• c1 is such that c2 c1 c3 c1 a5 c1 c1,
• c2 is such that d3 c2 c3 c2 c1 c2 c2,
• c3 is such that e1 c3 c1 c3 c2 c3 c3,
• d3 is such that d1 d3 d2 d3 c2 d3 d3,
• e1 is such that e2 e1 e3 e1 c3 e1 e1,
• for any other agent f ,  f is such that σ( f )  f π( f )  f f .
Further, for any α, β ∈ N, assume that α is unacceptable for β unless otherwise specified
above. In this problem (N,), where σ is the unique party permutation, we compare two
matchings illustrated in Figure 10:
μ =
{
{a1, b1}, {a2}{a3, a4}, {a5, c1},{a6, a7},
{b2, b3}, {c2, c3}, {d1, d2}, {d3}, {e1}, {e2, e3}
}
, and
μ′ =
{
{a1, b1}, {a2}{a3, a4}, {a5, c1},{a6, a7},
{b2, b3}, {c2, d3}, {c3, e1}, {d1, d2}, {e2, e3}
}
.
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To begin, note that μ is an outcome of our algorithm, and hence is SaRD up to depth
3 by Theorem 1.28 Next observe that μ′ differs from μ only in that c2 and c3 (who are
matched with each other at μ) are matched to d3 and e1 (who are single at μ). It is then
easy to confirm that μ′ Pareto-dominates μ, which is SaRD up to depth 3.
However, μ′ is not robust up to depth 3. To see this, consider the deviation (D, ν′)
from μ′ by D = {a1, a2}, and suppose that ν′κ Dκ ν′κ−1 . . . D1 ν and ν′κ D μ′. Notice
that a1 is matched to her best possible partner a2 at ν, and hence, she does not have an
incentive for another deviation unless a2 is gone. As a2 prefers only a3 to a1, then, wemust
have Dκ = {a2, a3}. Since {a2, a3} cannot form a deviation directly from μ′, it follows that
(D, ν′) is robust up to depth 1. Following similar arguments, we can further confirm that
Dκ−1 = {a4, a5} and Dκ−2  c1 are also necessary. As neither c2 nor c3 would deviate
from ν′ with c1, we should have κ > 3 and hence (D, ν) is robust up to depth 3. 
However, we can guarantee that the outcomes of our algorithm are Pareto efficient
when the problem is sufficiently simple in the following sense.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (N,) is such that for each agent a, the number of acceptable agents
to her (i.e., the cardinality of {b ∈ N : b a a}) is no greater than 2. Then, any outcome of the
algorithm in Section 3 is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let σ be a party permutation for (N,) and μ an outcome of the algorithm. Under
the assumption on , only π(a) and σ(a) are acceptable for a if |P(a)| > 2. As a conse-
quence, none of Σt is acceptable to xt in any step t of Phase 3, and no pairs among R0 are
mutually acceptable in Phase 5; that is, no pairs are matched during these two Phases.
Now suppose that ν Pareto dominates μ, and hence that there is a ∈ I◦μ such that
ν(a) a μ(a) by Lemma 1. By Property 2, P(a) must be an odd party. If P(a) is non-
solitary, ν(a) should be either π(a) or σ(a), since no other agent is acceptable to a as
28For instance, the algorithm outputs μ if one takes b2, c2, d1, and e2 to be “a ∈ P” in Phase 2, and label
x1 = a1 and x2 = c1 at the beginning of Phase 3.
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mentioned above. However, note that σ(a) and π2(a) are matched at μ to their best pos-
sible partners, σ2(a) and π(a). Therefore, σ(a) should prefer μ to ν if ν(a) = σ(a), and
π2(a) should prefer μ to ν if ν(a) = π(a). This is a contradiction. If P(a) is solitary,
|P(ν(a))| = 2 is necessary for a to be acceptable for ν(a). Moreover, if |P(ν(a))| = 2, then
ν(a) should prefer μ(ν(a)) = π(ν(a)) to a, as a should be inferior by the definition of a
party permutation.29 
6.3 Weak Stability against Robust Deviations
In this section we discuss an alternative, weaker version of our solution concept. Re-
call that the original definition of robust deviations, requires νκ D μ for any sequence
(D1, ν1), . . . , (Dκ, νκ) of subsequent deviations satisfying (∗). Alternatively, one could ar-
gue that a ∈ Dwould hesitate to form the original deviation (D, ν)when she is indifferent
between νκ and μ, if there is some (infinitesimally) small cost to form a deviation. To in-
vestigate such a scenario, let us call a deviation (D, ν) from μ strongly robust up to depth k if
it satisfies νκ D μ for any sequence for any κ ≤ k and any sequence (D1, ν1), . . . , (Dκ, νκ)
satisfying (∗). Correspondingly, we say a matching μ to be weakly SaRD up to depth k, if
no deviation from μ is strongly robust up to depth k. By definition, a matching is weakly
SaRD up to depth k if it is SaRD up to depth k.
With this weaker requirement, actually, we can always construct a matching that is
weakly SaRD up to depth k = 1. In doing so, we first provide a sufficient condition for a
matching to be weakly SaRD up to depth 1:
Lemma 8. Suppose that μ is an individually rational matching satisfying the following conditions
for all a ∈ N:
• if a is in an odd party (i.e., a ∈ P ∈P(σ) and |P| is odd), μ(a) is inferior for a; and
29Remember that when P(a) is solitary and hence π(a) = a, being acceptable for a is equivalent to being
superior for a.
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• if a is in an even party (i.e., a ∈ P ∈P(σ) and |P| is even), μ(a) a π(a).
Then, such a matching μ is weakly SaRD up to depth 1.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that μ is not weakly SaRD up to depth 1; i.e.,
there is a deviation (D, ν) that is strongly robust up to depth 1. Since μ is assumed to be
individually rational, so is ν. Throughout the remainder of the proof, let No and Ne be,
respectively, the members of odd parties and even parties.
We first show D ∩ No = ∅. If a ∈ D ∩ Ne, then ν(a) is superior for a, since by as-
sumptions, ν(a) a μ(a) a π(a). By the definition of a party permutation, a must be
inferior for ν(a). This implies that ν(a) is a member of No, since otherwise she should
prefer μ(ν(a)) ∈ {π(ν(a)), σ(ν(a))} to ν(ν(a)) ≡ a. Therefore, D ⊆ Ne is impossible.
Now let DS ⊆ D (resp. DI ⊆ D) be the set of a ∈ D such that ν(a) is superior (resp.
inferior) for a. By definition, DS ∪ DI = D and DS ∩ DI = ∅. Note that (D ∩ Ne) ⊆ DS
as argued in the previous paragraph, and that |DI | ≥ |DS| follows from the definition
of a party permutation. Therefore, |DI ∩ No| ≥ |DS ∩ No| must hold. Combined with
D ∩ No = ∅, it also follows that DI ∩ No = ∅.
Next, take an arbitrary a ∈ DI ∩No. Then a cannot be a member of a solitary party, i.e.,
{a} ∈ P .30 Further, we can check σ(a) ∈ DS as follows: Note first that ν(a) = σ(a) by
the assumption of a ∈ DI . If ν(σ(a)) is inferior for σ(a), then a = π(σ(a)) σ(a) ν(σ(a))
as well as σ(a) a ν(a). Thus we can take a new matching ν′ by matching a and σ(a) so
that ({a, σ(a)}, ν′) forms a deviation from ν. It follows from the individual rationality of
μ that μ(ν(a)) ν(a) ν(a) = ν′(ν(a)), which contradicts the strong robustness of (D, ν).
Therefore, ν(σ(a))must be superior for σ(a); that is, σ(a) ∈ DS. Analogously, we can also
verify π(a) ∈ DS: Otherwise {a,π(a)} forms a deviation ν′ and leads to a contradiction
with the strong robustness of (D, ν).
30If {a} ∈ P , then π(a) = a and hence, a ∈ DI is followed by a a ν(a) a μ(a). However, this
contradicts the individual rationality of μ.
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In the previous paragraph, we have shown that if a ∈ DI ∩ No, she is not in a soli-
tary party and σ(a),π(a) ∈ DS ∩ No. Therefore, |DI ∩ P| ≤ |DS ∩ P| holds for each odd
party P ∈ P(σ). Since DI ∩ No = ∅, further, the strict inequality holds for at least one
non-solitary odd party. Summing these inequalities across the odd parties, we obtain
|DI ∩ No| < |DS ∩ No|, but this is a contradiction because, as mentioned above, the defi-
nition of a party permutation implies |DI ∩ No| ≥ |DS ∩ No|. 
With the sufficient condition above, it is straightforward in any problem to construct
a weakly SaRD matching:
Theorem 4. For any roommate problem (N,), there exists a matching that is weakly SaRD up
to depth 1.
Proof. Fix a problem and a party permutation σ. Construct a matching μ as follows: For
each odd party P ∈ P(σ) and for each a ∈ P, let μ(a) = a. For each even party P′ ∈
P(σ), order its elements as P′ = {a1, a2 . . . , a2m} so that σ(a2j−1) = a2j for each j ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and let μ(a2j−1) = a2j for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. This μ is individually rational
and satisfies the conditions in Lemma 8. It is thus weakly SaRD up to depth 1. 
In the above proof, we leave all odd-party members unmatched so as to apply Lemma
8. This is not always necessary and there can exist a weakly SaRD matching up to depth 1
where some odd-party members are matched:
Example 5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and i be such that (i + 1) i (i − 1) i i (mod 3) for
each i ∈ N. Define three matchings μ, ν and ν′, respectively, by μ = {{1, 2}, {3}}, ν =
{{1}, {2, 3}} and ν′ = {{1, 3}, {2}}. In this problem, μ is weakly SaRD up to depth 1: the
only deviation from μ is ({2, 3}, ν), but this is not strongly robust up to depth 1 because
ν′ {1,3} ν and μ(2) = 1 2 2 = ν′(2). Symmetrically, ν and ν′ are also weakly SaRD up
to depth 1. 
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At the same time, however, it is sometimes necessary to unmatch all odd-party mem-
bers as in the next example. Consequently, there may not exist a regular matching that is
weakly SaRD up to depth 1.
Example 6. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and for each i ∈ N, let i be such that
• only i+ 1 and i− 1 (mod 5) are acceptable for i, and
• (i+ 1) i (i− 1) i i (mod 5).
In this problem, μ = id is the unique matching that is weakly SaRD up to depth 1.
To see μ = id is weakly SaRD up to depth 1, it suffices to check that neither ({1, 2}, ν1)
nor ({1, 2, 3, 4}, ν2) is strongly robust up to depth 1, where ν1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}} and
where ν2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}}, because all the other deviations are symmetric to either
of these two. Indeed, these deviations are not strongly robust: ν′1 = {{1}, {2, 3}, {4}, {5}}
is a deviation from ν1 with ν′1(1) 1 μ(1), and ν′2 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}} is a deviation from
ν2 with ν′2(3) 3 μ(3).
To see that no other matching is weakly SaRD up to depth 1, again, it suffices to
check ν1 and ν2 because all the other ones are equivalent to either of these two. Note
that ({4, 5}, ν3) is a deviation both from ν1 and from ν2, where ν3 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}}.
The only deviation from ν3 is (ν′3, {2, 3}) with ν′3 = {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}}, and both 4 and 5
are strictly better off at ν′3 than either at ν1 or at ν2. That is, ({4, 5}, ν3) is a strongly robust
deviation up to depth 1 either from ν1 or ν2, and thus, neither ν1 nor ν2 is weakly SaRD
up to depth 1. 
6.4 Relation to Other Solution Concepts
6.4.1 Bargaining Set
Particularly with depth k = 1, our definition of SaRD matchings might remind readers
of the bargaining set in cooperative game theory. In our definition, a deviation is robust
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if there is no further deviations that make an original deviator worse off, and a matching
is SaRD if there is no robust deviation. In cooperative games, an objection is justified if
it has no counterobjection, and an imputation is in the bargaining set if it has no justified
objection. By definitions, our SaRD is a weakening of stability, whereas the bargaining set
is a superset of the core, which is equivalent to the set of stable matchings in matching
models. Given those similarities, it would be natural to ask how the SaRD matchings
relate to the bargaining set.
To answer this question, we first observe through the following example that a SaRD
matching is not necessarily included in the bargaining set.31
Example 7. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and i be such that (i + 1) i (i − 1) i i (mod 3) for
each i ∈ N. In this problem, it is easy to check that μ = {{1, 2}, {3}} is SaRD (and hence
weakly SaRD, too) up to depth 1: (D, ν) = ({2, 3}, {{1}, {2, 3}}) is the only deviation
from μ, and this is not (weakly) robust as ν′ {1,3} ν and agent 2 ∈ D gets strictly worse
off at ν′ than at μ, where ν′ = {{1, 3}, {2}}. However, this μ is not in the bargaining set,
because ν′(1) = 3 1 2 = μ(1) and hence, ({1, 3}, ν′) is not qualified to be a counterob-
jection against ({2, 3}, ν).32 
To check the other inclusion, a result by Klijn and Massó (2003) in the marriage prob-
lem is helpful. To begin, note that the marriage problem can be embedded into the room-
mate problem as follows: a roommate problem (N,) is a marriage problem if there exist
disjoint M,W ⊆ N such that M ∪W = N, m m m′ for all m,m′ ∈ M and w w w′ for
all w,w′ ∈ W. In the marriage problem, Klijn and Massó (2003) call a matching μ weakly
stable if for any blocking pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W, either [1] there exists m′ ∈ M such that
31While there exist a number of different definitions for bargaining sets, the main point of the following
example is valid with all of those the authors are aware of, including the ones by Aumann and Maschler
(1964), Mas-Colell (1989), and Zhou (1994).
32In the standard definitions of bargaining sets, the agents involved in a counterobjection (i.e., {1, 3} in
this case) are required to get weakly better off than at the original outcome (i.e., μ in this case), not at the
objection that they counter (i.e., ν in this case).
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m′ w m and (m′,w) is a blocking pair for μ, or [2] there exists w′ ∈ W such that w′ m w
and (m,w′) is a blocking pair for μ. Klijn and Massó (2003, Theorem 4.2) show that in the
marriage problem, a matching is in Zhou’s (1994) bargaining set if and only if it is weakly
stable and weakly Pareto efficient. The next example demonstrates that a weakly stable
matching may not be weakly SaRD up to any depth k and consequently, Zhou’s (1994)
bargaining set is not included in the set of SaRD matchings up to any depth k.
Example 8. Let N = {m1,m2,w1,w2,w3} and  be such that
w1 m1 w2 m1 w3 m1 m1 m1 m2, w2 m2 w1 m2 w3 m2 m2 m2 m1,
m2 w1 m1 w1 w1 w1 w2 w1 w3, m1 w2 m2 w2 w2 w2 w1 w2 w3, and
w3 w3 m1 w3 m2 w3 w1 w3 w2.
This problem is a marriage problem with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1,w2,w3}. It is
easy to verify that μ = {{m1}, {m2}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}} is both weakly stable and weakly
Pareto efficient.33 By Klijn and Massó (2003, Theorem 4.2), it is thus in Zhou’s (1994) bar-
gaining set. However, this μ is neither SaRD nor weakly SaRD up to any depth k. To see
this, consider a deviation ({m1,m2,w1,w2}, ν) from μwhere ν = {{m1,w2}, {m2,w1}, {w3}}.
As there is no deviation from ν (i.e., ν is stable), this is a (strongly) robust deviation from
μ up to any depth k ≥ 1. 
Combining the observations in the two examples, we obtain the following:
Fact 2. For any k ≥ 1, the set of matchings that are (weakly) SaRD up to depth k neither always
includes nor is always included in the (Zhou) bargaining set.
33There are four blocking pairs for μ: (m1,w1), (m1,w2), (m2,w1), and (m2,w2). Regarding (m1,w1),
for instance, we have m2 w1 m1 and (m2,w1) being a blocking pair for μ. All the other three pairs are
symmetric. Note also that μ is weakly Pareto efficient because no other matching is strictly preferred by w3.
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6.4.2 Farsightedly Stable Set
Our concept of SaRD might also remind readers of the farsighted stable set à la Harsanyi
(1974), as condition (∗) in the definition of robust deviations might appear to resemble
indirect dominance in the definition of stable sets.34 In relation to the farsighted stable
set, we make two remarks here: First, the stable set is a set solution whereas ours is a
pointwise (i.e., matching-wise) concept. Moreover, Klaus et al. (2011) establish in the
roommate problem that a singleton is a farsighted stable set if and only if its unique ele-
ment is a stable matching.35 Therefore, although focusing on singletons can be a possible
way to compare a set solution with a point solution, such an approach is not helpful to
overcome the general non-existence of a stable matching in our setup.
Second, it should be also noted that we can obtain exactly the same set of results
even if we introduce “farsightedness” into our definitions. Specifically, let’s say that a
deviation (D, ν) is farsightedly-robust up to depth k, if νκ D μ for any sequence of
deviations (D1, ν1), . . . , (Dκ, νκ)with κ ≤ k that satisfies νκ Dλ νλ−1 for all λ ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
(with ν0 := ν) in addition to the original requirement (∗). Such definitions could be seen
“farsighted” as the agents in Dλ also compare the final outcome (i.e., νκ) with the situation
before they deviate (i.e., νλ−1), while they myopically compare νλ−1 and νλ in our original
definitions. Actually, however, those alternative definitions do not affect our results and
proofs at all. This is because whenever we consider a sequence of deviations, no agent
deviates more than once along the sequence; that is, when we conclude that an original
deviation is not robust up to depth k, it is also shown to be not farsightedly-robust up to
depth k in the above sense.
34For the formal definitions of farsighted stable sets, see also Chwe (1994) and Ray and Vohra (2015).
35See also Ehlars (2007) and Mauleon et al. (2011) for related results in the marriage problem.
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6.4.3 P-stable matching
Inarra et al. (2008) propose the following concept ofP-stable matching, which is closely
related to absorbing sets and stochastic stability in the roommate problem (Iñarra et al.,
2013; Klaus et al., 2011):
Definition 3. Given a stable partitionP = P(σ), a matching μ is said to beP-stable if
it satisfies the following property for each P ∈ P : if |P| is even, μ(a) ∈ {σ(a),π(a)} for
all a ∈ P; if |P| is odd, μ(a) ∈ {σ(a),π(a)} for all a ∈ P except for a unique b ∈ P such
that μ(b) = b. 
That is, P-stability requires to match as many “adjacent” pairs as possible in both
even and odd parties. This is in contrast with our construction of SaRD matchings: in
general, more than one members of a same odd party are unmatched at the outcomes
of our algorithm in Section 3. However, we can relate the P-stable matchings and our
concept of SaRD as follows:
Proposition 5. Suppose that #(N,) = 2k + 1 for some k ∈ N. Then, for any P-stable
matching μ′, there exists a matching μ that is SaRD up to depth k and “includes” μ′ in the sense
that μ′(a) = b = a implies μ(a) = b for all a, b ∈ N.
Proof. Suppose #(N,) = 2k+ 1 and fix an arbitraryP-stable matching μ′. By definition,
for each odd party P ∈ P(σ), there exists one and only one agent aP such that μ′(aP) =
aP. Let Λ0 to be the set of all such agents, and label its elements as Λ0 = {x1, . . . , xT},
where T is the number of the odd parties inP(σ). Then we construct μ from μ′ and Λ0
by iterating the following steps:
Step 0: For each a ∈ Λ0, let μ(a) := μ′(a).
Step t ≤ T: If xt ∈ Λt−1, then proceed to step t+ 1. Otherwise, let
Σ˜t := {y ∈ Λt−1 : xt is superior for y and y is acceptable for xt}.
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If Σ˜t is empty, let Λt := Λt−1 and proceed to step t + 1 without defining
μ(xt). Otherwise, define μ(xt) := yt, where yt is the best partner for xt
among Σ˜t (i.e., yt xt y for all y ∈ Σ˜t), and proceed to step t+ 1 with Λt :=
Λt−1 − {xt, yt}.
Step t > T: If there exists a mutually-acceptable pair (z,w) ∈ Λt−1 × Λt−1, then let
μ(z) := w and proceed to step t+ 1 with Λt := Λt−1 − {z,w}. Otherwise,
proceed to the final step with ΛF := Λt−1.
Final Step: For any a ∈ ΛF, define μ(a) := a.
Note that the resulting μ is a regular matching that “includes” the P-stable matching
μ′. Moreover, μ also satisfies Properties 1–2 and hence, we can apply all the Lemmas in
Section 4.36
Now, take an arbitrary deviation (D, ν) from μ. Suppose that Ch = ∅ = Cy, as
otherwise (D, ν) is not robust up to depth 1 by Claims 1–2. Note that there is b ∈ D ∩ I◦μ
by Lemma 1, and that P(b) is an odd party for I◦μ ⊆ Λ0 by construction. More specifically,
μ
(
σ2j−1(b)
)
= σ2j(b) holds for each j = 1, . . . , |P(b)|−12 . Let  be the smallest integer such
that ν
(
σ2−1(b)
) = σ2(b). Such must exist because by the assumption of Ch = ∅ = Cy,
b ∈ D∩ I◦μ implies b ∈ ν(Cy) and hence, π(b) ∈ Cy ⊆ Dmust hold. Moreover, σ2−1(b) is
not a member of D and thus, single at ν; otherwise, again by the assumption of Ch = ∅ =
Cy, σ2(b) ∈ ν(Cy) ⊆ I◦μ should hold, but this contradicts μ
(
σ2−1(b)
)
= σ2(b). Given
these observation, we can construct ν1, ν2, . . . , ν by matching D1 = {σ2−1(b), σ2−2(b)},
D2 = {σ2−3(b), σ2−4(b)}, . . ., D = {σ(b), b} so that ν D ν−1 D−1 . . . D1 ν. That
is, the deviation (D, ν) is not robust up to depth . Since  ≤ |P(b)|−12 ≤ k by definition,
we complete the proof. 
36To check Property 1, suppose that a is superior for b and μ(b) = b. If a ∈ Λ0, then μ(a) ∈ {π(a), σ(a)}
and hence, μ(a) a b holds. Otherwise, the assumptions imply that either a = xt is matched to yt, who is
the best partner among Σ˜t−1  b, or a = yt is matched to xt, who is superior for a, at some step t. In either
case, a prefers μ(a) to b.
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Figure 1: Tree of deviations
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(a) Phase 1: P ∈ E
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
(b) Phase 2: P ∈ O3×
Figure 2: Matching during Phases 1 and 2 of the Algorithm. For each j, bj represents σj(a).
Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the agents represented by
black circles are not matched in Phase 2.
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(a) Case of q being even
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
(b) Case of q being odd
Figure 3: Matching of the agents among σ(yt), . . . , σq(yt) in Case 1 of Phase 3. For each
j, zj denotes σj(yt). Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the
agents represented by black circles are not matched in this step.
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(a) Case of r = 3n for some n ∈ N
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??
?
(b) Case of r = 3n+ 1 for some n ∈ N ∪ {0}
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??? ??
?
(c) Case of r = 3n+ 2 for some n ∈ N ∪ {0}
Figure 4: Matching of the agents among σ(xt), . . . , σr(xt) in Case 1 of Phase 3. For each
j, wj denotes σj(xt). Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the
agents represented by black circles are not matched in this step.
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(a) Matching of P(yt)
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
?? ?? ?? ??? ??? ???
(b) Matching of P(xt) with |P(xt)| = 3n+ 1 for some n ∈ N
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ???
?
(c) Matching of P(xt) with |P(xt)| = 3n+ 2 for some n ∈ N
Figure 5: Matching of the agents in P(xt), P(yt) ∈ Ut−1 in Case 2 of Phase 3. For each j,
zj and wj denote, respectively, σj(yt) and σj(xt). Each arrow between two agents means
they are matched, and the agents represented by black circles are not matched in this step.
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(a) Matching of P ∈ V with |P| = 7
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??? ????? ??
?
(b) Matching of P ∈ V with |P| = 3n+ 1 > 7 for some n ∈ N
? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
(c) Matching of P ∈ V with |P| = 5
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ????? ??
?
(d) Matching of P ∈ V with |P| = 3n+ 2 for some n ∈ N
Figure 6: Matching during Phase 4. For each j, bj denotes σj(a). Each arrow between
two agents means they are matched, and the agents represented by black circles are not
matched in this Phase.
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?
?(?)
?(?(?))
(a) Case of t∗ = 2.
? ? ?
?
?(?)
?
(b) Case of t∗ = 1.
Figure 7: Definition of Cy: If a ∈ Cy, there exists t∗ such that (π ◦ ν)t∗(a) = a.
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(a) Matching μ in Example 2
?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? ?? ??
??
?? ?? ??
?? ??
(b) Matching μ′ in Example 2
Figure 8: Matching μ and μ′ in Example 2. Each box represents an element of the stable
partitionP(σ). Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the agents
represented by dark-gray circles are the members of I◦μ and I◦μ′ .
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(a) Matching μ in Example 2
?? ?? ???? ??
?? ?? ???? ??
??
(b) Matching μ′ in Example 2
Figure 9: Matching μ and μ′ in Example 3. Each box represents an element of the stable
partitionP(σ). Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the agents
represented by dark-gray circles are the members of I◦μ and I◦μ′ .
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(a) Matching μ in Example 4
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? ?? ??
??
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? ?? ??
(b) Matching μ′ in Example 4
Figure 10: Matching μ and μ′ in Example 4. Each box represents an element of the stable
partitionP(σ). Each arrow between two agents means they are matched, and the agents
represented by dark-gray circles are the members of I◦μ and I◦μ′ .
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